Version 1.15. Drop support for Perl 4 in pgpverify. Convert the manual
page to POD and expand it, and include it directly in the script. Reorganize the script so that it begins to be more structured with proper subs, and make it pass use strict. Fixed support for the -test switch.
This commit is contained in:
Russ Allbery
parent
86c134e5a3
commit
a71a0a7527
1 changed files with 384 additions and 185 deletions
569
pgpverify
569
pgpverify
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@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
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#! /usr/bin/perl -ws
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do '@LIBDIR@/innshellvars.pl';
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# Remove the above line if not running as part of INN.
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#
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# written April 1996, tale@isc.org (David C Lawrence)
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# Version 1.14, 6 May 2001
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# Currently maintained by Russ Allbery <rra@stanford.edu>
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# Version 1.15, 25 Nov 2002
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#
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# NOTICE TO INN MAINTAINERS: The version that is shipped with INN
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# is the same as the version that I make available to the rest of the
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@ -10,6 +12,11 @@ do '@LIBDIR@/innshellvars.pl';
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#
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# This program is intended to be compatible with Perl 4 and Perl 5.
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#
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# Changes from 1.14 -> 1.15
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# -- Added POD documentation.
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# -- Fixed the -test switch so that it works again.
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# -- Dropped Perl 4 compatibility and reformatted. Now passes use strict.
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#
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# Changes from 1.13.1 -> 1.14
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# -- Native support for GnuPG without the pgpgpg wrapper, using GnuPG's
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# program interface by Marco d'Itri.
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@ -131,13 +138,13 @@ $lockdir = $tmpdir;
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# $syslog_method = ''; # Don't ever try to do syslogging.
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$syslog_method = 'logger'; # search for the logger program
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# The next two variables are the values to be used for syslog's facility and
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# level to use, as would be found in syslog.conf. For various reasons, it is
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# impossible to economically have the script figure out how to do syslogging
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# correctly on the machine. If you have INN and the script is able to
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# successfully include you innshellvars.pl file, then the value of
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# $inn::syslog_facility will override this value of $syslog_facility;
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# $syslog_level is unaffected.
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# The next two variables are the values to be used for syslog's facility
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# and level to use, as would be found in syslog.conf. For various
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# reasons, it is impossible to economically have the script figure out how
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# to do syslogging correctly on the machine. If you have INN and the
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# script is able to successfully include you innshellvars.pl file, then
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# the value of $inn::syslog_facility will override this value of
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# $syslog_facility; $syslog_level is unaffected.
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$syslog_facility = 'news';
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$syslog_level = 'err';
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@ -148,28 +155,40 @@ $syslog_level = 'err';
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# $log_date = 1; # non-zero means do it.
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$log_date = -t STDOUT; # do it if STDOUT is to a terminal
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### Exit value:
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### 0 good signature
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### 1 no signature
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### 2 unknown signature
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### 3 bad signature
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### 255 problem not directly related to pgp analysis of signature
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# End of configuration section.
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# not syslogged, such an error is almost certainly from someone running
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require 5;
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use strict;
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use vars qw($gpgv $pgp $keyring $tmp $tmpdir $lockdir $syslog_method
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$syslog_facility $syslog_level $log_date $test $messageid);
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# Turn on test mode if the first argument is '-test'.
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if ($1 && $1 eq '-test') {
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shift @ARGV;
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$test = 1;
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}
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# Not syslogged, such an error is almost certainly from someone running
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# the script manually.
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die "Usage: $0 < message\n" if @ARGV != 0;
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$0 =~ s%^.*/%%; # trim /path/to/prog to prog
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$pgp = $inn'pgp if $inn'pgp && $inn'pgp ne "no-pgp-found-during-configure";
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$gpgv = $inn'gpgv if $inn'gpgv;
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$tmp = ($inn'pathtmp ? $inn'pathtmp : $tmpdir) . "/pgp$$";
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$lockdir = $inn'locks if $inn'locks;
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$syslog_facility = $inn'syslog_facility if $inn'syslog_facility;
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if (! $keyring && $inn'newsetc) {
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$keyring = $inn'newsetc . '/pgp' if -d $inn'newsetc . '/pgp';
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# Grab various defaults from innshellvars.pl if running inside INN.
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$pgp = $inn::pgp
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if $inn::pgp && $inn::pgp ne "no-pgp-found-during-configure";
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$gpgv = $inn::gpgv if $inn::gpgv;
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$tmp = ($inn::pathtmp ? $inn::pathtmp : $tmpdir) . "/pgp$$";
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$lockdir = $inn::locks if $inn::locks;
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$syslog_facility = $inn::syslog_facility if $inn::syslog_facility;
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if (! $keyring && $inn::newsetc) {
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$keyring = $inn::newsetc . '/pgp' if -d $inn::newsetc . '/pgp';
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}
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# Trim /path/to/prog to prog for error messages.
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$0 =~ s%^.*/%%;
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# Make sure that the signature verification program can be executed.
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if ($gpgv) {
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if (! -x $gpgv) {
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&fail("$0: $gpgv: " . (-e _ ? "cannot execute" : "no such file") . "\n");
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@ -178,111 +197,142 @@ if ($gpgv) {
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&fail("$0: $pgp: " . (-e _ ? "cannot execute" : "no such file") . "\n");
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}
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# this is, by design, case-sensitive with regards to the headers it checks.
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# it's also insistent about the colon-space rule.
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while (<>) {
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# if a header line ends with \r\n, this article is in the encoding
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# it would be in during an NNTP session. some article storage
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# managers keep them this way for efficiency.
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$nntp_format = /\r\n$/ if $. == 1;
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s/\r?\n$//;
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last if /^$/;
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if (/^(\S+):[ \t](.+)/) {
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($label, $value) = ($1, $2);
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$dup{$label} = 1 if $header{$label};
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$header{$label} = $value;
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} elsif (/^\s/) {
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&fail("$0: non-header at line $.: $_\n") unless $label;
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$header{$label} .= "\n$_";
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} else {
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&fail("$0: non-header at line $.: $_\n");
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}
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}
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$pgpheader = "X-PGP-Sig";
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exit 1 unless $_ = $header{$pgpheader}; # no signature
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# the regexp below might be too strict about the structure of pgp sig lines
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# the $sep value means the separator between the radix64 signature lines
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# can have any amount of spaces or tabs, but must have at least one space
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# or tab, if there is a newline then the space or tab has to follow the
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# newline. any number of newlines can appear as long as each is followed
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# by at least one space or tab. *phew*
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$sep = "[ \t]*(\n?[ \t]+)+";
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# match all of the characters in a radix64 string
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$r64 = '[a-zA-Z0-9+/]';
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&fail("$0: $pgpheader not in expected format\n")
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unless /^(\S+)$sep(\S+)(($sep$r64{64})+$sep$r64+=?=?$sep=$r64{4})$/;
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($version, $signed_headers, $signature) = ($1, $3, $4);
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$signature =~ s/$sep/\n/g;
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$message = "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\n\n";
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$message .= "X-Signed-Headers: $signed_headers\n";
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foreach $label (split(",", $signed_headers)) {
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&fail("$0: duplicate signed $label header, can't verify\n")
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if $dup{$label};
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$message .= "$label: ";
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$message .= "$header{$label}" if $header{$label};
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$message .= "\n";
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}
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$message .= "\n"; # end of headers
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while (<>) { # read body lines
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if ($nntp_format) {
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# check for end of article; some news servers (eg, Highwind's "Breeze")
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# include the dot-CRLF of the NNTP protocol in the article data passed
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# to this script
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last if $_ eq ".\r\n";
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# remove NNTP encoding
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s/^\.\./\./;
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s/\r\n$/\n/;
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}
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s/^-/- -/; # pgp quote ("ASCII armor") dashes
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$message .= $_; # append to output string
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}
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$message .= "\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n";
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$message .= "Version: $version\n";
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$message .= $signature;
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$message .= "\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n";
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open(TMP,">> $tmp") || &fail("$0: open > $tmp: $!\n");
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-f TMP ||
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&fail("$0: $tmp not a plain file, possible security violation attempt\n");
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(stat(_))[3] == 1 ||
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&fail("$0: $tmp has hard links, possible security violation attempt\n");
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seek(TMP, 0, 0); # make sure pointer is at beginning of file
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truncate(TMP, 0); # make sure file is zero length
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print TMP $message;
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close(TMP) || &errmsg("$0: close > $tmp: $!\n");
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&fail("$0: write error for message to check\n")
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if -s $tmp != length($message);
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print $message if $test;
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# Parse the article headers and generate the PGP message.
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my ($nntp_format, $header, $dup) = &parse_header();
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exit 1 unless $$header{'X-PGP-Sig'};
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my $message = &generate_message($nntp_format, $header, $dup);
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&write_message($message);
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# Verify the message.
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my ($ok, $signer);
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if ($gpgv) {
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($ok, $signer) = &gpg_check($tmp, $keyring);
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} else {
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($ok, $signer) = &pgp_check($tmp, $keyring);
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}
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print "$signer\n" if $signer;
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exit $ok;
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# Parse the article headers and return a flag saying whether the message
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# is in NNTP format and then two references to hashes. The first hash
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# contains all the header/value pairs, and the second contains entries for
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# every header that's duplicated. This is, by design, case-sensitive with
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# regards to the headers it checks. It's also insistent about the
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# colon-space rule.
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sub parse_header {
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my (%header, %dup, $label, $value);
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while (<>) {
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# If the first header line ends with \r\n, this article is in the
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# encoding it would be in during an NNTP session. Some article
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# storage managers keep them this way for efficiency.
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my $nntp_format = /\r\n$/ if $. == 1;
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s/\r?\n$//;
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last if /^$/;
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if (/^(\S+):[ \t](.+)/) {
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($label, $value) = ($1, $2);
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$dup{$label} = 1 if $header{$label};
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$header{$label} = $value;
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} elsif (/^\s/) {
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&fail("$0: non-header at line $.: $_\n") unless $label;
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$header{$label} .= "\n$_";
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} else {
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&fail("$0: non-header at line $.: $_\n");
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}
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}
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$messageid = $header{'Message-ID'};
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return ($nntp_format, \%header, \%dup);
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}
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# Generate the PGP message to verify, undoing the same transformation as
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# is applied by signcontrol (along with other changes required to deal
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# with NNTP wire format and to quote the message properly for PGP). Takes
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# the hash of headers and header duplicates returned by parse_header.
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sub generate_message {
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my ($nntp_format, $header, $dup) = @_;
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# The regexp below might be too strict about the structure of pgp sig
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# lines.
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# The $sep value means the separator between the radix64 signature lines
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# can have any amount of spaces or tabs, but must have at least one
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# space or tab, if there is a newline then the space or tab has to
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# follow the newline. Any number of newlines can appear as long as each
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# is followed by at least one space or tab. *phew*
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my $sep = "[ \t]*(\n?[ \t]+)+";
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# Match all of the characters in a radix64 string
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my $r64 = '[a-zA-Z0-9+/]';
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local $_ = $$header{'X-PGP-Sig'};
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&fail("$0: X-PGP-Sig not in expected format\n")
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unless /^(\S+)$sep(\S+)(($sep$r64{64})+$sep$r64+=?=?$sep=$r64{4})$/;
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my ($version, $signed_headers, $signature) = ($1, $3, $4);
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$signature =~ s/$sep/\n/g;
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my $message = "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\n\n";
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$message .= "X-Signed-Headers: $signed_headers\n";
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my $label;
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foreach $label (split(",", $signed_headers)) {
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&fail("$0: duplicate signed $label header, can't verify\n")
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if $$dup{$label};
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$message .= "$label: ";
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$message .= "$$header{$label}" if $$header{$label};
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$message .= "\n";
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}
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$message .= "\n"; # end of headers
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while (<>) { # read body lines
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if ($nntp_format) {
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# Check for end of article; some news servers (eg, Highwind's
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# "Breeze") include the dot-CRLF of the NNTP protocol in the article
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# data passed to this script
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last if $_ eq ".\r\n";
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# Remove NNTP encoding
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s/^\.\./\./;
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s/\r\n$/\n/;
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}
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s/^-/- -/; # pgp quote ("ASCII armor") dashes
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$message .= $_; # append to output string
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}
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$message .= "\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n";
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$message .= "Version: $version\n";
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$message .= $signature;
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$message .= "\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n";
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return $message;
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}
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# Write a PGP message to a file. Attempt to do so safely.
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sub write_message {
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my ($message) = @_;
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open(TMP,">> $tmp") || &fail("$0: open > $tmp: $!\n");
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-f TMP ||
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&fail("$0: $tmp not a plain file, possible security violation attempt\n");
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(stat(_))[3] == 1 ||
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&fail("$0: $tmp has hard links, possible security violation attempt\n");
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seek(TMP, 0, 0); # make sure pointer is at beginning of file
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truncate(TMP, 0); # make sure file is zero length
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print TMP $message;
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close(TMP) || &errmsg("$0: close > $tmp: $!\n");
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&fail("$0: write error for message to check\n")
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if -s $tmp != length($message);
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print $message if $test;
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}
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# Check the signature using PGP (including 2.6.2, 5.0, and the pgpgpg
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# wrapper for GnuPG).
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sub pgp_check {
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($file, $ring) = @_;
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my ($file, $ring) = @_;
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$ENV{'PGPPATH'} = $ring if $ring;
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@ -290,7 +340,7 @@ sub pgp_check {
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# write a file named randseed.bin but doesn't do its own locking as it
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# should, and the consequences of a multiprocess conflict is failure to
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# verify.
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$lock = "$lockdir/LOCK.$0";
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my $lock = "$lockdir/LOCK.$0";
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until (&shlock($lock) > 0) {
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sleep(2);
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@ -326,7 +376,8 @@ sub pgp_check {
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# 1024 bits, Key ID B88DA9C1, Created 1996-04-10
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# "news.announce.newgroups"
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$ok = 2; # unknown signature result is default
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my $ok = 2; # unknown signature result is default
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my $signer;
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if (/B[Aa][Dd] signature /) {
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$ok = 3;
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} elsif (/Good signature from user(: (.*)| "(.*)"\.)/ ||
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@ -343,13 +394,13 @@ sub pgp_check {
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# Check the signature using GnuPG.
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sub gpg_check {
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($file, $ring) = @_;
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my ($file, $ring) = @_;
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$opts = '--quiet --status-fd=1 --logger-fd=1';
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my $opts = '--quiet --status-fd=1 --logger-fd=1';
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if ($ring) {
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$opts .= " --keyring=$ring/pubring.gpg";
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} else {
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$opts .= " --keyring=pubring.gpg";
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$opts .= ' --keyring=pubring.gpg';
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}
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open(PGP, "$gpgv $opts $file 2> /dev/null |") ||
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@ -368,7 +419,10 @@ sub gpg_check {
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}
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}
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$ok = 255; # default exit status
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print if $test;
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my $ok = 255; # default exit status
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my $signer;
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if (/\[GNUPG:\]\s+GOODSIG\s+\S+\s+(\S+)/) {
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$ok = 0;
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$signer = $1;
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@ -386,13 +440,12 @@ sub gpg_check {
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# Log an error message, attempting syslog first based on $syslog_method
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# and falling back on stderr.
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sub errmsg {
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$_[0] =~ s/\n$//;
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my ($message) = @_;
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$message =~ s/\n$//;
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$date = '';
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my $date = '';
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if ($log_date) {
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eval "require 'ctime.pl'";
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($date = &ctime(time)) =~ s/\d{4}\n//
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unless $@;
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($date = localtime) =~ s/\d{4}\n//;
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}
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if ($syslog_method && $] >= 5.006) {
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@ -401,7 +454,9 @@ sub errmsg {
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}
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if ($syslog_method eq "logger") {
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@loggers = ('/usr/ucb/logger', '/usr/bin/logger', '/usr/local/bin/logger');
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my @loggers = ('/usr/ucb/logger', '/usr/bin/logger',
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'/usr/local/bin/logger');
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my $try;
|
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foreach $try (@loggers) {
|
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if (-x $try) {
|
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$syslog_method = $try;
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@ -412,39 +467,35 @@ sub errmsg {
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}
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|
||||
if ($syslog_method ne '' && $syslog_method !~ m%/logger$%) {
|
||||
if ($] >= 5) {
|
||||
eval "use Sys::Syslog";
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
eval "require 'syslog.pl'";
|
||||
}
|
||||
eval "use Sys::Syslog";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ($@ || $syslog_method eq '') {
|
||||
warn $date, "$0: trying to use perl's syslog: $@\n" if $@;
|
||||
warn $date, $_[0], "\n";
|
||||
warn $date, "... while processing $header{'Message-ID'}\n"
|
||||
if $header{'Message-ID'};
|
||||
warn $date, $message, "\n";
|
||||
warn $date, "... while processing $messageid\n"
|
||||
if $messageid;
|
||||
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
$_[0] .= " processing $header{'Message-ID'}"
|
||||
if $header{'Message-ID'};
|
||||
$message .= " processing $messageid"
|
||||
if $messageid;
|
||||
|
||||
if ($syslog_method =~ m%/logger$%) {
|
||||
unless (system($syslog_method, "-i", "-p",
|
||||
"$syslog_facility.$syslog_level", $_[0]) == 0) {
|
||||
"$syslog_facility.$syslog_level", $message) == 0) {
|
||||
if ($? >> 8) {
|
||||
warn $date, "$0: $syslog_method exited status ", $? >> 8, "\n";
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
warn $date, "$0: $syslog_method died on signal ", $? & 255, "\n";
|
||||
}
|
||||
$syslog_method = '';
|
||||
&errmsg($_[0]);
|
||||
&errmsg($message);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
# setlogsock arrived in perl 5.004_03 to enable Sys::Syslog
|
||||
# to use a Unix domain socket to talk to syslogd, which is
|
||||
# the only way to do it when syslog runs with the -l switch.
|
||||
# setlogsock arrived in perl 5.004_03 to enable Sys::Syslog to use a
|
||||
# Unix domain socket to talk to syslogd, which is the only way to do
|
||||
# it when syslog runs with the -l switch.
|
||||
if ($syslog_method eq "unix") {
|
||||
if ($^O eq "dec_osf" && $] >= 5) {
|
||||
eval 'sub Sys::Syslog::_PATH_LOG { "/dev/log" }';
|
||||
|
|
@ -452,14 +503,14 @@ sub errmsg {
|
|||
if ($] <= 5.00403 || ! eval "setlogsock('unix')") {
|
||||
warn $date, "$0: cannot use syslog_method 'unix' on this system\n";
|
||||
$syslog_method = '';
|
||||
&errmsg($_[0]);
|
||||
&errmsg($message);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# unfortunately, there is no way to definitively know in this program if
|
||||
# the message was logged. I wish there were a way to send a message
|
||||
# to stderr if and only if the syslog attempt failed.
|
||||
# Unfortunately, there is no way to definitively know in this
|
||||
# program if the message was logged. I wish there were a way to
|
||||
# send a message to stderr if and only if the syslog attempt failed.
|
||||
&openlog($0, 'pid', $syslog_facility);
|
||||
&syslog($syslog_level, $_[0]);
|
||||
&closelog();
|
||||
|
|
@ -473,12 +524,12 @@ sub fail {
|
|||
exit 255;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# get a lock in essentially the same fashion as INN's shlock.
|
||||
# return 1 on success, 0 for normal failure, -1 for abnormal failure.
|
||||
# "normal failure" is that a lock is apparently in use by someone else.
|
||||
# Get a lock in essentially the same fashion as INN's shlock. return 1 on
|
||||
# success, 0 for normal failure, -1 for abnormal failure. "normal
|
||||
# failure" is that a lock is apparently in use by someone else.
|
||||
sub shlock {
|
||||
local($file) = @_;
|
||||
local($ltmp, $pid);
|
||||
my ($file) = @_;
|
||||
my ($ltmp, $pid);
|
||||
|
||||
unless (defined(&ENOENT)) {
|
||||
eval "require POSIX qw(:errno_h)";
|
||||
|
|
@ -490,7 +541,7 @@ sub shlock {
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
$ltmp = ($file =~ m#(.*/)#)[0] . "shlock$$";
|
||||
$ltmp = ($file =~ m%(.*/)%)[0] . "shlock$$";
|
||||
|
||||
# this should really attempt to use another temp name
|
||||
-e $ltmp && (unlink($ltmp) || return -1);
|
||||
|
|
@ -540,38 +591,186 @@ sub shlock {
|
|||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Our lawyer told me to include the following. The upshot of it is
|
||||
# that you can use the software for free as much as you like.
|
||||
=head1 NAME
|
||||
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 1996 UUNET Technologies, Inc.
|
||||
# All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
||||
# are met:
|
||||
# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
||||
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
||||
# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
||||
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
||||
# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
||||
# 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
||||
# must display the following acknowledgement:
|
||||
# This product includes software developed by UUNET Technologies, Inc.
|
||||
# 4. The name of UUNET Technologies ("UUNET") may not be used to endorse or
|
||||
# promote products derived from this software without specific prior
|
||||
# written permission.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY UUNET ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
|
||||
# IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
|
||||
# WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
||||
# ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL UUNET BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
|
||||
# INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
|
||||
# (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
|
||||
# SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
||||
# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
||||
# STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
||||
# ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
||||
# OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
pgpverify - Cryptographically verify Usenet control messages
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 SYNOPSIS
|
||||
|
||||
B<pgpverify> [B<-test>] < I<message>
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 DESCRIPTION
|
||||
|
||||
The B<pgpverify> program reads (on standard input) a Usenet control
|
||||
message that has been cryptographically signed using the B<signcontrol>
|
||||
program (or some other program that produces a compatible format).
|
||||
B<pgpverify> then uses a PGP implementation to determine who signed the
|
||||
control message. If the control message has a valid signature,
|
||||
B<pgpverify> prints (to stdout) the user ID of the key that signed the
|
||||
message. Otherwise, it exits with a non-zero exit status.
|
||||
|
||||
If B<pgpverify> is installed as part of INN, it uses INN's configuration
|
||||
to determine what signature verification program to use, how to log
|
||||
errors, what temporary directory to use, and what keyring to use.
|
||||
Otherwise, all of those parameters can be set by editing the beginning of
|
||||
this script.
|
||||
|
||||
By default, when running as part of INN, B<pgpverify> expects the PGP key
|
||||
ring to be found in I<pathetc>/pgp (as either F<pubring.pgp> or
|
||||
F<pubring.gpg> depending on whether PGP or GnuPG is used to verify
|
||||
signatures). If that directory doesn't exist, it will fall back on using
|
||||
the default key ring, which is in a F<.pgp> or F<.gnupg> subdirectory of
|
||||
the running user's home directory.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 OPTIONS
|
||||
|
||||
The B<-test> flag causes B<pgpverify> to print out the input that it is
|
||||
passing to PGP (which is a reconstructed version of the input that
|
||||
supposedly created the control message) as well as the output from PGP's
|
||||
analysis of the message.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 EXIT STATUS
|
||||
|
||||
B<pgpverify> may exit with the following statuses:
|
||||
|
||||
=over 5
|
||||
|
||||
=item 0Z<>
|
||||
|
||||
The control message had a good PGP signature.
|
||||
|
||||
=item 1
|
||||
|
||||
The control message had no PGP signature.
|
||||
|
||||
=item 2
|
||||
|
||||
The control message had an unknown PGP signature.
|
||||
|
||||
=item 3
|
||||
|
||||
The control message had a bad PGP signature.
|
||||
|
||||
=item 255
|
||||
|
||||
A problem occurred not directly related to PGP analysis of signature.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 ENVIRONMENT
|
||||
|
||||
B<pgpverify> does not modify or otherwise alter the environment before
|
||||
invoking the B<pgp> or B<gpgv> program. It is the responsibility of the
|
||||
person who installs B<pgpverify> to ensure that when B<pgp> or B<gpgv>
|
||||
runs, it has the ability to locate and read a PGP key file that contains
|
||||
the PGP public keys for the appropriate Usenet hierarchy administrators.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 NOTES
|
||||
|
||||
Historically, Usenet news server administrators have configured their news
|
||||
servers to automatically honor Usenet control messages based on the
|
||||
originator of the control messages and the hierarchies for which the
|
||||
control messages applied. For example, in the past, David Lawrence always
|
||||
issued control messages for the "Big 8" hierarchies (comp, humanities,
|
||||
misc, news, rec, sci, soc, talk). Usenet news administrators would
|
||||
configure their news server software to automatically honor newgroup and
|
||||
rmgroup control messages that originated from David Lawrence and applied
|
||||
to any of the Big 8 hierarchies.
|
||||
|
||||
Unfortunately, Usenet news articles (including control messages) are
|
||||
notoriously easy to forge. Soon, malicious users realized they could
|
||||
create or remove (at least temporarily) any Big 8 newsgroup they wanted by
|
||||
simply forging an appropriate control message in David Lawrence's name.
|
||||
As Usenet became more widely used, forgeries became more common.
|
||||
|
||||
The B<pgpverify> program was designed to allow Usenet news administrators
|
||||
to configure their servers to cryptographically verify control messages
|
||||
before automatically acting on them. Under the pgpverify system, a Usenet
|
||||
hierarchy maintainer creates a PGP public/private key pair and
|
||||
disseminates the public key. Whenever the hierarchy maintainer issues a
|
||||
control message, he uses the B<signcontrol> program to sign the control
|
||||
message with the PGP private key. Usenet news administrators configure
|
||||
their news servers to run the B<pgpverify> program on the appropriate
|
||||
control messages, and take action based on the PGP key User ID that signed
|
||||
the control message, not the name and address that appear in the control
|
||||
message's From or Sender headers.
|
||||
|
||||
Thus, using the B<signcontrol> and B<pgpverify> programs appropriately
|
||||
essentially eliminates the possibility of malicious users forging Usenet
|
||||
control messages that sites will act upon, as such users would have to
|
||||
obtain the PGP private key in order to forge a control message that would
|
||||
pass the cryptographic verification step. If the hierarchy administrators
|
||||
properly protect their PGP private keys, the only way a malicious user
|
||||
could forge a validly-signed control message would be by breaking the
|
||||
public key encryption algorithm, which (at least at this time) is believed
|
||||
to be prohibitively difficult for PGP keys of a sufficient bit length.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 SEE ALSO
|
||||
|
||||
gpgv(1), pgp(1)
|
||||
|
||||
L<ftp://ftp.isc.org/pub/pgpcontrol/> is where the most recent versions of
|
||||
B<signcontrol> and B<pgpverify> live, along with PGP public keys used for
|
||||
hierarchy administration.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 HISTORY
|
||||
|
||||
B<pgpverify> was written by David C Lawrence <tale@isc.org>. Manual page
|
||||
provided by James Ralston.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 COPYRIGHT AND LICENSE
|
||||
|
||||
David Lawrence wrote: "Our lawyer told me to include the following. The
|
||||
upshot of it is that you can use the software for free as much as you
|
||||
like."
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright (c) 1996 UUNET Technologies, Inc.
|
||||
All rights reserved.
|
||||
|
||||
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
|
||||
met:
|
||||
|
||||
=over 3
|
||||
|
||||
=item 1.
|
||||
|
||||
Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
|
||||
this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
||||
|
||||
=item 2.
|
||||
|
||||
Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
|
||||
this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
|
||||
and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
||||
|
||||
=item 3.
|
||||
|
||||
All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software must
|
||||
display the following acknowledgement:
|
||||
|
||||
This product includes software developed by UUNET Technologies, Inc.
|
||||
|
||||
=item 4.
|
||||
|
||||
The name of UUNET Technologies ("UUNET") may not be used to endorse or
|
||||
promote products derived from this software without specific prior written
|
||||
permission.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
||||
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY UUNET "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
|
||||
WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
|
||||
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN
|
||||
NO EVENT SHALL UUNET BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
||||
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
|
||||
TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
|
||||
PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
|
||||
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
|
||||
NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
|
||||
SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
|
||||
=cut
|
||||
|
||||
# Local variables:
|
||||
# cperl-indent-level: 2
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue